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SURVEY SECTION
Constitutional Law. State v. Jeremiah, 696 A.2d 1220 (R.I.
1997). A search warrant which fails to describe the place to be
searched "as nearly as may be" violates a person's constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures, and re-
quires suppression of the evidence gathered under the warrant.
Article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution provides
in part that "no warrant shall issue but on complaint in writing,
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
describing as nearly as may be, the place to be searched."1 In State
v. Jeremiah,2 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a search
warrant authorizing the search of a "sprawling"3 commercial park
consisting of eighteen multistory buildings. The court held that
the warrant did not describe the target of the search "as nearly as
may be," thereby violating article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island
Constitution.4 Consequently, the trial court should have sup-
pressed the evidence seized under the warrant.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Silver Spring Center is a commercial park located in Provi-
dence, Rhode Island.6 The park consists of at least eighteen mul-
tistory buildings and ten warehouses across twelve acres of land,
all addressed at 387-389 Charles Street.7 The park was divided
into forty-four units, which were rented to thirty-three different
tenants.8
A confidential informant notified police that Andrew Jeremiah
and others were storing 500 pounds of marijuana in two crates at
387 Charles Street as part of a drug-trafficking operation. 9 Police
surveillance subsequently witnessed the suspects driving into a ga-
l. R.I. Const. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis added).
2. 696 A.2d 1220 (R.I. 1997).
3. Id. at 1221.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 1225.
6. See id. at 1221.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1224. The entire Silver Spring Center was owned by the two
defendants. See Paul Davis, Brothers Keep Costs Down at Silver Spring, Prov. J.
Bull., Dec. 24, 1989, at G1. This fact was not mentioned in the court's opinion.
9. See Jeremiah, 696 A.2d at 1221. In a twist of fate, Andrew Jeremiah and
his brother Bruce, a codefendant, played a significant role in a previous search and
seizure decision. See State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291, 293-94 (R.I. 1984) (noting that
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rage located in "Building 5" of the complex. 10 Police submitted a
complaint requesting authorization to search a "four story red
brick factory complex with a loading dock and a large garage over-
head door" located at 387 Charles Street.'1 The warrant was is-
sued authorizing the search of the "387-389 Charles Street
Jeremiah Silver Ctr. Complex."12
An officer, posing as a fire inspector, was eventually allowed to
tour Building No. 4, which fit the description in the complaint, and
Building No. 5, a three-story building without a loading dock.13 In
Building No. 5, the officer noticed two large crates, showed the
warrant and opened the crates. The crates contained 425 pounds
of marijuana. A subsequent search of Building No. 4 uncovered
several additional bags of marijuana. 14
At trial, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the
warrant and moved to suppress the evidence seized during the
search. 15 The trial judge denied the motion.16 Ajury convicted the
defendants of possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute.17
BACKGROUND
Article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution is analo-
gous to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.' 8 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reserves the
right to provide citizens of the state with additional protections
against governmental intrusions under the state constitution than
those afforded by the United States Constitution. 19 This reserva-
the Jeremiahs had been the victims of a robbery, and Andrew had aided in the
execution of a challenged search warrant).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 1222.
16. See id.
17. See id. Three of the defendants were sentenced to 25 years, with varying
years to serve. See Dawn Ang, 2 Cranston Brothers, Man From Toronto Receive
Jail Terms, Prov. J. Bull., July 30, 1995, at B3. A fourth defendant did not appear
for trial. See id. Andrew Jeremiah was later indicted for perjury in connection
with the trial. See Convicted Global Drug Dealer Indicted for Perjury at Trial,
Prov. J. Bull., February 2, 1996, at D3.
18. See State v. Berker, 391 A.2d 107, 111 (R.I. 1978).
19. See Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1361 (R.I. 1984).
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tion is to be used sparingly, as the Fourth Amendment generally
offers ample protection.20
The court had previously held in State v. Costakos21 that the
requirements of article 1, section 6 are not satisfied when the war-
rant description is so indefinite as to allow an officer to use selec-
tive discrimination in determining where to search. 22
Additionally, the warrant is unconstitutionally broad if the de-
scription contained therein is so general as to permit the officer to
invade the property of strangers to the process. 23
The United States Supreme Court discussed the problem of
overbroad descriptions of the place to be searched in Maryland v.
Garrison.24 In Garrison, the warrant described the search area as
the "third floor apartment."25 Unknown to the police officers, how-
ever, the building contained two third-floor apartments. 26 The
Supreme Court held that the validity of the warrant must be
judged on the knowledge available to the officers at the time they
acted.27 The facts of the case showed that the officers had taken
extensive efforts to describe the area to be searched, and therefore
the factual mistake did not invalidate the warrant. 28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Using the language of State v. Costakos,29 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court found that the warrant in question did not differ-
entiate the targeted area of the search from all other places in the
complex.30 Consequently, the warrant authorized the police of-
ficers to search "the entire twelve-acre, eighteen-building, ten-
warehouse, eighty-three-separate-unit Silver Center compound."31
The court held that this amounted to "a modem-day version of the
20. See id.
21. 226 A.2d 695 (R.I. 1967).
22. See id. at 697.
23. See id.
24. 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
25. Id. at 80.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 85.
28. See id.
29. 226 A.2d 695 (R.I. 1967).
30. See Jeremiah, 696 A.2d at 1224.
31. Id.
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dreaded writ of assistance"32 and a violation of the defendants' con-
stitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 33
The Rhode Island Supreme Court distinguished Maryland v.
Garrison34 on the grounds that the officers had not exhausted all
reasonably available means to describe the area "as nearly as may
be."3 5 The court noted that the confidential informant had seen
the crates in the building, but neither the application nor the war-
rant reflected where the crates were last observed.36 Furthermore,
the State did not disclose to the court what, if any, additional
knowledge the officers possessed about the layout of the complex
before applying for the warrant.37 The supreme court suppressed
the evidence gathered pursuant to the warrant and remanded the
case to the superior court.38
CONCLUSION
In Jeremiah, the Rhode Island Supreme Court served notice to
law-enforcement officials that an application for a search warrant
must describe the place to be searched "as nearly as may be" under
article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The court en-
deavored to eliminate search warrants that are so broad that they
invade the rights of parties who are strangers to the proceedings.
Officers must exhaust all available means to ensure that warrants
are drawn as narrowly as possible to avoid this intrusion. Failing
to use all possible sources to narrow the warrant subjects it to a
finding of generality and unconstitutionality. Where the court
finds the description of the area to be searched indefinite, effec-
tively allowing law enforcement officers to exercise wide discretion
and search the property of non-suspects, the warrant will be found
32. Id. at 1225. The court's opinion was long on historical references to the
evils of British "writs of assistance." These writs were used before the Revolution-
ary War to allow agents of the Crown to search for smuggled goods without limita-
tions. See Black's Law Dictionary 1609 (6th ed. 1990).
33. See Jeremiah, 696 A.2d at 1225.
34. 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
35. Jeremiah, 696 A.2d at 1224.
36. See id. at 1225.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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to be unconstitutional and the evidence gathered will be
suppressed.
Mark R. Quigley
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Constitutional Law. State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695
A.2d 502 (R.I. 1997). Section 21-28-5.04.2(j)(1) of the Rhode Island
General Laws allows the State to appeal from an adverse judge-
ment in a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding. The State's appeal
does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the Rhode
Island or federal Constitutions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 20, 1992, police executed a search warrant at the
home of Oscar Caba (Caba).1 Pursuant to the search, the police
found heroin and money. The police also found original purchase
records, in Caba's name, for a 1990 Chevrolet Corvette. 2 On April
2, 1992, the State seized the Corvette. On November 5, 1992, the
State proceeded against the Corvette by filing a civil in rem com-
plaint in district court pursuant to section 21-28-5.04.2 of the
Rhode Island General Laws.3
The State claimed that Caba purchased the Corvette with pro-
ceeds from "illegal sales of controlled substances."4 Therefore,
under section 21-28-5.04.2, the Corvette was subject to civil forfei-
ture.5 Caba's sister, Jacqueline Francisco (Francisco), answered
the State's complaint.6 In her answer, Francisco claimed that "she
was the innocent owner of the Corvette and that it had not been
purchased with drug proceeds."7
At a district court hearing, the State offered evidence to show
that Caba was the owner of the Corvette. First, three months
before the police executed the search warrant, the Corvette was
kept at Caba's home.8 Second, Caba negotiated the price of the car
and paid for the Corvette.9 Third, Caba "had attempted to obtain a
1. State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d 502, 503 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. See id. Rhode Island General Laws § 21-28-5.04(a) states in part that
"[any property, real or personal, including but not limited to ... any property
constituting, or derived from any proceeds, furnished or intended to be furnished
by any person for the transportation of or in exchange for a controlled substance
... shall be seized and forfeited ... ." R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28-5.04(a) (1997).
6. See One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 503.
7. Id.
8. See id. (stating that Francisco and Caba did not reside together).
9. See id. (stating that he paid $19,500 in cash for the automobile).
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Florida registration for the vehicle in the name 'Jackeline Fran-
cisco' through an accomplice of Caba's in the heroin trafficking en-
terprise alleged against Caba."10
Francisco testified that she had borrowed the money and had
given it to Caba to purchase the Corvette." She claimed that she
asked Caba to purchase the car for her because of her inexperience
in buying cars. 12 The district court judge entered judgment in
favor of Francisco, finding that "the state has not established prob-
able cause to show that the Corvette had been purchased with
drug proceeds."' 3 The district court judge ordered the State to re-
turn the car to Francisco. 14
The State filed a notice of appeal to the Rhode Island Superior
Court, pursuant to section 21-28-5.04.2(j)(1) of the Rhode Island
General Laws.15 That section states, in part, that "[ain appeal
may be claimed by either party from any judgment of forfeiture
rendered by the district court, to be taken in like manner as by
defendants in criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the district
court to try and determine."' 6
Francisco moved to dismiss the appeal. 17 She argued that the
State was prohibited from appealing the district court's decision
for two reasons. First, the civil in rem forfeiture statute did not
provide the State with a right to appeal.' 8 Second, the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of both the Rhode Island and federal Constitu-
tions prohibited the appeal. 19 The Rhode Island Superior Court
dismissed the State's appeal. The court found the statute "did not
grant the state a right of appeal and that the state and federal
double jeopardy clauses prohibited such an appeal."20 The State
appealed from that decision. 21
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 504.
16. R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28-5.04.2(j)(1) (1956) (1989 Reenactment).
17. See One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 504.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 503.
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BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's opinion relied on the re-
cent case of United States v. Ursery.22 In Ursery, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of double jeopardy in civil for-
feitures. The Court said that it has "consistently conclud[ed] that
the [Double Jeopardy] Clause does not apply to such actions be-
cause they do not impose punishment."23
The Ursery Court also discussed the case of United States v.
Halper,24 where the Court considered "whether and under what
circumstances a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment' for the
purposes of double jeopardy analysis."25 In Halper, the defendant
overcharged the Government $585 through Medicare claims. 26
The Government brought a civil action against Halper in district
court.27 The district court found Halper liable to the Government.
Under the civil False Claims Act, specifically 31 U.S.C. § 3729,
Halper would have been subject to a penalty of more than
$130,000.28 The district court found the full penalty would consti-
tute a second punishment. Therefore, it reduced Halper's fine to
$16,000, which was the full penalty on eight of the sixty-five
counts. 29
On the United States's motion for reconsideration, the district
court admitted error by only calculating damages on eight of the
claims, but still felt $130,000 would constitute a second punish-
ment.30 Finding the full penalty would violate double jeopardy,
22. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
23. Id. at 2140. In an earlier case, Various Items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931), the Court discussed the relationship between
the Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeiture. In a civil in rem forfeiture pro-
ceeding, "[i]t is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal
fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inani-
mate and insentient." Id. at 581. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not
apply. See id.; see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354 (1984) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to civil in rem
forfeiture proceedings).
24. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
25. Id. at 436.
26. Id. at 437.
27. See id. at 438. Halper had already been criminally convicted and sen-
tenced to two years in prison and a fine. See id. at 437.
28. See id. at 438.
29. See id. at 438-39.
30. See id. at 439-40.
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the district court amended its judgment and lowered the fine to
double the Government's damages and its cost of the suit.3 1
The United States Government appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court. 32 The Supreme Court held that "a
defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecu-
tion may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the ex-
tent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."33 Courts must
look to the civil penalty and the amount necessary to compensate
the Government to determine if a rational relationship exists.34 If
the penalty appears to be more a punishment than a compensa-
tion, "then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Gov-
ernment's damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in
fact constitutes a second punishment."35 Therefore, a civil penalty
will be considered punishment "when the sanction as applied in
the individual case serves the goals of punishment."36
In Ursery, the Court noted the difference between a civil pen-
alty and a civil forfeiture. Halper involved a civil penalty, not a
civil forfeiture. 37 Civil penalties are intended to compensate the
Government for the harm it suffered and often consist of a fine.38
A civil forfeiture serves to "confiscate property used in violation of
the law, and to require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal con-
duct."39 There is difficulty in measuring the nonpunitive purposes
served by a civil forfeiture.40 As such, it is "difficult to determine
whether a particular forfeiture bears no rational relationship to
the nonpunitive purposes of that forfeiture."41
The Court held that "the case-by-case balancing test set forth
in Halper, in which a court must compare the harm suffered by the
Government against the size of the penalty imposed, is inapplica-
ble to civil forfeiture."42 Instead, the Court set forth a two-part
31. See id. at 440.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 448-49.
34. See id. at 449.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 448.
37. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144.
38. See id. at 2145.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42 Id.
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test created in earlier cases, to determine if a forfeiture proceeding
is criminal and punitive rather than civil and remedial.43
The first step examines the legislature's intent: Is the forfei-
ture statute intended to be criminal or civil?44 If the intent is crim-
inal, then the penalty constitutes double jeopardy. If civil, then
the Court looks at the proceedings to determine "whether the pro-
ceedings are so punitive in fact as to 'persuade us that the forfei-
ture proceeding[s] may not legitimately be viewed as civil in
nature' despite Congress's intent."45
ANALYSis AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed two issues on ap-
peal. The first was whether the statute granted the State a right of
appeal. Secondly, would the State's appeal violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of both the Rhode Island and federal
Constitutions?46
The court held that the general assembly intended to give the
State a right to appeal from an adverse ruling under the statute.47
The court's analysis in interpreting section 21-28-5.04 focused on
the phrase "either party."48 In a civil in rem forfeiture case, the
only two parties are the State and a claimant.49 Therefore, the
court determined that the phrase "either party" means the State
and/or a claimant.50
The court found this to be true although the statute allows an
appeal from "any judgment of forfeiture."5 1 This language sug-
gests that only an aggrieved claimant whose property the court has
deemed subject to forfeiture can appeal. However, the court recog-
43. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2142; see also United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (holding that Congress intended such forfeitures to
be civil and remedial, rather than criminal and punitive).
44. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
45. Id. (citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366).
46. See State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d 502 (R.I. 1997). The
United States Constitution provides that "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Rhode Island Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause reads that "[njo person shall
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." R.I. Const. art. I, § 7.
47. See One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 504.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id.
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nized that "such an interpretation would render the words 'either
party' mere surplusage."5 2
Francisco also argued that the phrase "to be taken in like
manner as by defendants in criminal case" means the State does
not have a right to an appeal.53 As the State does not have a right
of appeal in a criminal case, the State should not be allowed the
right of appeal in a civil-forfeiture proceeding.54 The court found
this to be an awkward reading of the statute and "that the word
'manner' is more properly understood as speaking to the procedure
to be followed in taking an appeal."55
Section 21-28-5.04.2(o) requires that the State return the
property to the claimant after an unfavorable judgment against
the State.56 Francisco argued that the General Assembly intended
the proceedings would end at that point.57 The court rejected this
argument, stating "that the General Assembly did not intend the
property to be returned until after the appellate process had been
concluded, knowing that the state's appeal would serve to stay the
District Court's order."58
The court next addressed the issue of double jeopardy. 59 "[I]n
this case, unless there is state action amounting to a criminal pros-
ecution, there is no proceeding to which double jeopardy would at-
tach."60 The court used Ursery's two-part test to determine if the
civil-forfeiture statute violated double jeopardy.6 1
First, the court determined whether the legislature intended
the proceeding to be criminal or civil in nature. 62 The court looked
to the statute's language. First, the title of the statute, "Civil for-
feiture proceeding," distinguished it from section 21-28-5.04.1,
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id..
56. R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28-5.04.2(o) (1956) (1989 Reenactment).
57. See One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 504-05.
58. Id. at 505; see also R.I. Dist. Ct. R. Civ. P. 62, 73 (1997).
59. The court noted it had "interpreted our state constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy in a manner consistent with the Federal Constitution...
so that our inquiry is ultimately the same under either clause." One 1990 Chevro-
let Corvette, 695 A.2d at 505.
60. Id. at 506.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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which is entitled "Criminal forfeiture procedures."63 Additionally,
the statute clearly states that the "proceedings shall be in the na-
ture of an action in rem and shall be governed by the civil rules for
in rem proceedings."64 The court found that "the statutory lan-
guage signals the clear legislative intent that these forfeiture pro-
ceedings are to be civil in nature rather than criminal."65
The court next looked to see whether the effect of the proceed-
ing was "so punitive as to be criminal despite the legislative in-
tent."66 Focusing on what is done with the forfeited property, the
court found that the statute was not punitive, but that it served
remedial goals. 67  For example, under section 21-28-
5.04(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Rhode Island General Laws, the law enforce-
ment agencies share in the property that is subject to forfeiture.68
This serves the purpose of reimbursing the public for the money
spent "in apprehending the property and the criminal."6 9 It also
insures that the criminal does not profit from his crime. 70 The
court held that the proceeding was civil in nature and did not vio-
late the Double Jeopardy Clause. 71 The court remanded the case
for a trial de novo on the issue of the State's appeal. 72
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding in One 1990 Cor-
vette makes it clear that the State may appeal an adverse ruling in
a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding. This appeal does not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the state or federal Constitu-
tion because the proceeding is characterized as civil rather than
criminal. In addition, the court overruled its prior decision of State
63. Id.
64. R.I. Gen. Laws §21-28-5.04.2(a) (1989).
65. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 506. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court noted that the superior court, in deciding the issue, "characterized the civil
in rem forfeiture proceeding as quasi-criminal and thus concluded that the state
was not allowed to appeal from an adverse ruling." Id. at 504.
66. Id. at 506.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 507; see also R.I. Gen. Laws §21-28-5.04.2(b)(3)(A)(ii) (1956)
(1989 Reenactment).
69. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 507.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 508.
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v. One Lot of $8,560 in U.S. Currency,73 which held that the analy-
sis in Halper controlled civil in rem forfeiture proceedings. 74 The
United States Supreme Court in Ursery said that a civil in rem
forfeiture proceeding is unique and must be analyzed to see if it is
a criminal sanction. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
"[tlo the extent One Lot held that Halper guides our double jeop-
ardy analysis for civil in rem forfeiture proceedings, it is no longer
controlling."75
Lisa M. Kolb
73. 670 A.2d 772 (R.I. 1996).
74. See id. at 775.
75. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 507-08.
4271998]
